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Abstract
This article uses  impulse response  functions based on vector autoregressive  models for
eight OECD countries to analyze how oil price shocks  move through major channels of
the economy to affect aggregate  economic activity and inflation.  For each country, the
model represents  the interactions between real oil prices, aggregale  economic activity
and monetary and financial variables. The results suggest  that for energy-importing
countries, an oil price shock presents  a trade-off between an increased  price level and a
GDP loss. Although it does not appear that an energy-importing country can use its
intemal macroeconomic  policies to eliminate the effect of oil price shocks  on GDP,
counfties seem  to be able to defer and reduce the effect by accepting higher rates of
inflation.
The authors wish to thank Nathan Balke, Doug Bohi, Mike  Canes,  Joe Haslag, Prakash
Loungani and Robert Rich for helpful comments and discussions  on earlier drafts.  The
views expressed  are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas or to the Federal Reserv€ Svstem.1,  Introduction
Oil price shocks  have major effects on world economies. Whether directly or
indirectly,  changes  in oil prices  have  affected  ouput and inflation (Hamilton 1983,  1988,
1996;  Tatom 1988;  Mork 1989,1994:  Kahn and Hampton 1990;  and Huntington 1995).
Oil price shocks  have also been a source of economic fluctuation in the United States
over the past  three decades (Miller, Supel  and Tumer 1980; Kim and Loungani 1991;
Finn 1991;  and Raymond and Rich 1996). The preponderance of evidence suggests  that
rising oil pdces contributed to falling output and increased  inflation  during the 1970s  and
early 1980s,  and that falling oil prices boosted output and lessened  inflation  during the
mid to late 1980s. In a departure from the remainder of the literature, Bohi (1989),
argues  that intemal monetary policies account for the GDP losses  resulting ftom  oil
price shocks.
Although there are many estimates  of how sensitive output and inflation  are to
changes  in the price of oil, little  econometric research  has been directed toward
examinilg  how a country's monetary policy response  to an oil pdce shock can affect its
output growth and inflation.  In this article, we construct a vector autoregressive  (VAR)
model of eight OECD countries to examine how monetary vaxiables  affect the way oil
price shocks  are transmitted to aggregate  economic activity.  The model represents  the
interactiors between oil prices, real GDP, a monetary aggtegate,  short-terrn interest
rates, the spread between long-term and short{erm  interest rates, and the GDP deflatorfor the period 1973  through 1994.
Our approach adds to the existing research  on the aggregate  effects of oil price
shocks  in several ways. We sort through induced policy effects with a more complete
model and compare across  countries.  Comparisons  across  the eight countries allow us to
distill  the trade-off between GDP loss and inflation  that each country faces as oil prices
rise.  An examination of tlese trade-offs allows us to assess  how intemal monetary
policies affect the GDP loss and inflation  that a country experiences  and to see  how each
country might have fared under a neutral monetary policy.  The time periods we use for
tle  analysis  include periods in which oil prices fell sharply, as well as periods in which
prices  were rising.
Our analysis  shows  that for energy-importing countries, a real oil price shock
yields a tradeoff between a loss of GDP and higher inflation.  Policy can affect the
timing of the GDP response  and how much of the shock is experienced as a loss in
GDP and how much as an increase in the price level.  Our estimates suggest  that a
country cannot eliminate the GDP response,  but it can cushion the effect by accepting
hieher inflation.
2.  Analytical Framework and Estimation
To analyze the effects of oil price changes  on inflation, we constructed a vector
autoregressive  (VAR)  model to represent the relationships between oil prices, aggregate
economic activity, financial variables and inflation.  The model consists  of six variables:
athe real price of oil, real gross  domestic product (GDP), a monetary aggregate,  a short-
tenn interest rate, the spread  between long-term and short-term interest rates, and the
GDP deflator.
Economic Theory and Model Interpretalion
Although we impose no long-run structural priors on the model, it can be taken to
represent several major relationships in aggregate  economic activity.  For example, the
model contains variables that allow it to represent the monetary equation of exchange:
MV=PY
where M  is the monetary aggregate; V is the velocity of the monetary aggregate;  P is the
aggregate  price level; and f  is real GDP.  Velocity is commonly represented as a
function of interest rates because  money demand is sensitive  to the opportunity cost of
holding money balances. With  some  money balances  paying interest rates, the irrclusion
of a short-term interest rate and a spread variable allows for two major influences on
velocity.
The model also has the potential to represent the relationship between energy
(oil)  price movements and aggregate  economic activity (GDP).  This relationship is one
avenue through which real energy prices can have a pemxment effect on the aggregate
price level.  Higher energy prices reflect the increased  scarcity of this productive input
and are expected to reduce real GDP.  Under a neutral monetary stance (defined here
as one in which MV  or nominal GDP is held constant), a reduction in real GDP must
be accompanied  by an equal percentage increase in the aggregate  price level.
In addition, the model can be taken to represent the direct incorporation of
(1)energy prices into the aggregate  price level.  Nonetheless,  the direct inclusion of energy
prices into the aggregate  price level would not be expected  to yield a permanent change
in the price level.  Under the monetary equation of exchange,  a change in energy prices
camot  have a permanent effect on the price level unless real GDP, the monetary
aggregate  or velocity are altered.r
Dala
For the United States,  the oil price variable is real composite refiners' acquisition
cost, and the monetary aggregate  is represented  by M2.  The interest rate is the federal
funds rate.  The spread variable is the difference between mtes on U.S. treasury bonds
with a constant maority  of ten years and the federal funds rate.  Our measure of
inflation  is the implicit  GDP deflator.  GDP is in constant 1987  dollars.  All  the variables
are endogenous. We use quarterly data spanning  the period from first quarter 1973
through fourth quarter 1994.2
For Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy, Japan,  Norway  and the United Kingdom,  we
use quarterly data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International
Monetary Fund.  The data used for France, Iapan, Norway and the United Kingdom
span first quarter 1973  tlrough  fourth quarter 1993. Data for Italy ran from fourth
quafier 1974  through third  quarter of 1993. The series  for Canada include first quarter
1975  through fourth quarter of 1993. For Germany, real GDP data was.available only
from third  quarter of  1978  through fourth quarter 1993.
For all countries,  real oil prices  are expressed  in real own currency. The U.S.
imported refiners' acquisition cost is converted to each country's own currency by the
4market exchange  rate and then deflated by the appropriate deflator.  The monetary
aggregate,  similar to M2 in the United States  is "Money"  (including demand deposits
and currency outside banks) plus "Quasi-Money"  (including time, savings,  and foreign
cunency  deposits),  as  defined  by the IFS.
The short-term interest rate is the money market rate, which is tle  rate at which
short-tenn lending between financial institutions occurs. The long-term rate is the
government bond yield for France, Germany, Japan and Norway, and the long-term
govemment bond yield for Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom.  The spread variable
is the difference between these short and long-term mtes.
For Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom, GDP is
measured in 1990  own currency.  For Japan, GNP is measured in 1990  Yen.  The
deflator for all countries  is an implicit deflator, very similar to tlrc U.S. measure.
Model Specifuatian
As an initial  step in our econometric work,  we performed several diagnostic
checks  to assess  tlre conect specification for the various series. We tested for
stationarity using augmented  Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, and concluded that
we could not reject the hypothesis  that all of the series were integrated of order of one.
Thus, the flrst differences of the series were stationary.
There are two approaches  in using nonstationary data in.a VAR  model.  One is to
formulate an error-conection  model in frst  differences with cointegrating terms.  An
alternative to the error-correction approach is to estimate the VAR  in levels, without
explicitly modeling the cointegrating relationships.  Given the length of the data seriesand the number of variables, we selected  a VAR  model in log levels.
A good case  exists for examining the model in levels.  The low power of
cointegration tests and tie  resulting unc€rtainty about the number of cointegrating
vectors conditions the test results from an error-correction model.  The levels model is a
generalized version of an error-correction model, and its estimates  are not conditional
upon the estimated number of cointegrating relationships and their estimated values.
Although some tests on a VAR  model in levels do not have standard distributions, the
tests  presented  in this paper do (Sims,  Stock  and Watson,  1990).
The lag lengths of the VAR  models were determined by testing various lag
lengths against the alternative of one less lag.  The method of testing was the likelihood
ratio test corrected for small samples  using Sims' (1980) suggestion. The tests are valid
because  the null hypothesis  can be represented by restrictions on stationary variables, as
is required for the use of standard distributions with the levels model (Campbell and
Penon, 1991). The resulting  lag lengths  were as  follows:  two for Canada,  five for
France, six for Germany, five for ltaly, five for Japan, four for Norway, three for the
U.K. and five for the U.S.
Sensitivi$ Analysis
To better understand the properties of the estimated VAR  models and to see if
they behaved in accordance  with economic theory, we calculated-  impulse responses  and
confidence intervals for exogenous  one-time shocks  in the monetary aggregate  and the
short-term interest rate, in addition to the oil price shock, for all countries.  The
responses  to monetary and interest rate shocks  generally conforrn to economic theory.
6Although we only report the rezults of our levels models, we examined different
forms of the model.  We ran the model in first differences within an error correction
framework, and found little  difference in the results. We tested for structural breaks il
ow  1973-1995  time-frame and found no significant break in that time horizon.
For tle  United States,  we conducted sensitivity tests of the model by using
altennte  variables for the monetary aggregate,  the short-term interest rate and the oil
price.  We used both bond-adjusted M2 and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis'
measure of the monetary base in place of M2, the rate of retum on fteasury bills of a
three-month constant maturity in place of the federal funds rate and an ag$egate energy
price variable in place of oil prices.  In addition, we considered the oil price as an
exogenous  variable.  In all of these variants, we found the results to be zubstantially
similar to tlose  reported below.
Impulse Responsef
To examine the affect of oil price shocks  on the various economies and inflation,
we calculated impulse response  furrctions. The impulse response  function traces over
time the effects on a variable of a given shock to the innovations from an equation in the
VAR  system. The persistence  of a shock tells us how fast the system  adjusts  back to
equilibrium.  The faster a shock dampens,  the faster the adjusfrnent. We analyzed the
effects of a one-time oil price shock (based on a Choleski decornposition  . of the
covariance matrix) and traced the effects of this shock on each of the variables.
We used the estimated coefficients of the VAR  system  of equations and Monte-
Carlo integration with 1,000  replications to compute confidence bands for the impulseresponse  functions.  The methodology follows Kloek and Van Dijk  (1978) with the
coefficient draws directly from the estimated posterior distribution of the coefficients.
This methodology yields 80-percent confidence bands for the impulse response  functions
of the variables in the model.  These bands can be used to distinzuish where the impulse
response  functions differ  significantly from zero.
3.  The United States
For the United States,  ttrc impulse responses  indicate that an oil price shock
affects all other variables in the model significantly, as shown h  figure 1  Some of the
effects are transitory, some are long lived, and some are pennanent.  We analyze and
report the U.S. response  in detail, as a blueprint for the otler  countries.
GDP Response
Real GDP initially  responds  to a one-standard  deviation shock in the real oil
price with a barely significant uptick that lasts four quarters and reaches  a maximum of
0.5 percent in the fourth quarter.  The effect on GDP is insignificant in quarters five
tlrough  ten, after which to GDP becomes  negative. GDP falls a maximum of 2.9
percent below its pre-shock value by quarter 29.  Thereafter, the impulse to GDP
weakens,  and it is no longer significant by quarter 34.
Our findings  are sirnilar  to those  of Hamilton (1983),  T*om  (1988),  Molk  (1989
and 1994),  and Huntington (1995) who all find decreases  in real gross  national product
after an oil price shock. Like Tatom, we find only temporary decline in output results
from an oil price shock. If the maximum decline in GDP is normalized by the maximumincrease  in the price of oil, the resulting  oil price elasticity  of GDP is -0.031."  This
elasticity  is near the average  of -0.05-and  well within the range  of estimates  of -0.02  to -
0.076--found  in a 1987  Energy  Modeling Forum study  (Hickman et al, 1987).
Inlercst Rates  and Monetary Responses
On tle  financial side, the oil-price shock leads to a transitory increase in short-
tenn interest rates, a transitory decline in the spread between long-terrn and short-terrn
interest rates, and a delayed response  in M2.  The federal funds rate rises 15 percent
above its pre-shock value by the fourth quarter, 30 percent by the eighth quarter, and 37
percent  by the eleventh  quarter. Impulses  to the federal  funds  rate lose significance  in
the twelfth quarter.
The interest-rate spread falls 5.3 percent below its pre-shock value by the fourth
quarter and 10.6  percent by the eighth quafier.  The difference between the decline in
the spread and the increase in the federal funds rate may be taken to imply that long-
term rates also rise, but not as much as short-term rates.  Impulses to the spread lose
significance in the ninth quarter, implying there is no difference between the response  of
long and short rates after two years.
The increase  in oil prices  yields  a delayed  response  in M2.  The oil price shock
has no significant effect on M2 until  quarter 41.  After  becoming significant, the M2
response  increases  steadily throughout the time horizon, with M2-rising 27 percent above
its pre-shock  value  in quarter  60.
Inflatianary  Response
A shock to oil prices leads to a permanent increase in the price level.  In addition,
9the price level rises ttrroughout tle  60-quarter time horizon.s During the first  ll
quarters, the price level rises at an increasing rate.  At  four quarters, the price level is
0.7  percent  higher  than its pre-shock  value;  at eight quarters,  it is 2.5 percent  higher;
and at eleven  quarters,  it is 4.3  percent  higher.
After  the eleventh quarter the impetus to inflation  moderates. Nonetheless,
inflation persists and the price level rises throughout the 60-quarter time horizon and
remairs significant.  At the end of the period, the price level is 24.8 percent higher than
its pre-shock value, and the elasticity of the price level with respect to the same  period
real price of oil is 0.26.
Inflalion,  GDP and Monetary Policy
Throughout the 60-quarter time horizon, we find that an oil price shock yields a
greater percentage increase in the GDP deflator than the percentage  decline in real
GDP.  In other words, an oil pdce shock results in an expansion  of nominal GDP, a
finding that is inconsistent with a neutral monetary policy.  The expansion  of nominal
GDP implies that accommodative  monetary policy validates the inflationary impact of oil
price shocks,  which is consistent  with Trehan's  (1990)  analysis."
The response  of real GDP and the price level are consistent with a supply-side
response  to an oil price shock.  The shift in aggregate  supply lowers output and
increases  prices.  The Federal Reserve tries to offset the rise in prices by increasing the
federal funds rate to slow the rate of money growth.  In the medium term, howevef, the
policy is neither strong enough nor persistent enough to prevent a rise in nominal GDP,
as the velocity of money increases. At  16 quarters after the oil price shock, M2 is
l0unchanged  from its pre-shock level, but nominal GDP is 4.9 percent higher than its pre-
shock level.  Over the longer run, velocity returns to its pre-shock levels, but the money
supply is increased. At  60 quarters, M2 is 27 percent higher than its pre-shock value and
nominal GDP is 28 percent higher.
4.  TIIE  RESPONSE TO OIL  PRICE SHOCKS
The estimated responses  show that oil price shocks  play an important role in the
evolution of real and financial variables in the eight countries.  Each of the countries
respond somewhat  differently to a shock in the real price of oil.  Differences in policy, as
well as the energy consumption-to-GDP ratios account for differing responses  across  the
countries.  Table 1 summarizes  the impulse responses  to an oil price shock for the eight
countries.
Canada
For Canada, an energy-exporting  country, real GDP shows  no response  to a real
oil price shock, hence the oil-price elasticity of real GDP is zero.  Although higher
energy prices increase  the value of Canadian exports, which increase Canadian income,
Canadian ouQut remains unchanged.
Nonetheless,  short-term interest rates are pushed permanently higher in Canada.
Increased interest rates increase  the velocity of money, and even.,without  a significant
change in the money supply, the price level is significantly higher through the first 30
quarters.  The rise in nominal GDP is indicative of expansionary  monetary policy that
often results from improved terms of trade.  After  a lag of 30 quartets, the money supply
llis reduced, and inflation  is eliminated.  Normalizing the maximum gah  in the price level
by the maximum gain in the real Canadian dollar price of oil the yields an estimated oil-
pdce elasticity  of the price level equal  to 0.081.
Fmnce
The oil price shock leads to an immediate and persistent loss of real GDP for
France.  By qtarter  42, French GDP falls by a maximum of 4.8 percent.  Thereafter, the
loss in real GDP moderates. Normalizing the maximum loss in GDP by the maximum
gain in the real French franc price of oil yields an estimated oil-price elasticity of real
GDP equal  ro -0.069.
The monetary aggregate  is not affected significantly in response  to an oil price
shock, while short-term interest rates rise temporarily.  The oil price shock gives rise to
an i.ncrease  in the price level, but the increase is transitory, becoming insignificant after
the 16th quarter.  For the maximum significant increase in the French price level, the
corresponding  oil-price elasticity  of the price level is 0.031.
In the 16 quarters in which the price level is significant, the price level rises by
less than the decline in GDP, reducing nominal GDP.  This response  suggests  a
restrictive monetary policy following an oil price shock for France.
Germany
For Germany, the oil price shock leads to a persistent loss of real GDP.  By
quarter 60, real GDP is reduced 12.3  percent.  Short-term interest rates rise temporarily
in Germany and are significant only through the first five quarters.  The monetary
aggregate  shows  a continuous decline throughout the 60-quarter time horizon.  The GDP
t2deflator also declines continuously throughout the 60-quarter time horizon.  The declines
in the monetary aggregate,  real GDP, and ttre deflator are indicative of a contractionary
monetary policy.  For tlte maximum change in the price level, the oil-price elasticity of
the  price  level  is -0.186.
Itall
For Italy, the oil price shock initially  leads to a slight rise in real GDP that is
significant through the first four quarters.  By the twelfth quarter real GDP begins a
significant decline, reaching a minimum of 3.5 percent by quarter 21.  The effect on
GDP is transitory, becoming insignificant after the 29th quarter.  For the maximum loss
in real GDP, the oil-price elasticity  of real Italian GDP is -0.048.
The Italian monetary aggregate  shows  a transitory reduction in response  to an oil
price shock, from quarter five through quarter 13, but becomes  insignificant thereafter.
Short-term interest rates rise sharply for  12 quarters before moderating and becoming
insignificant around quarter ,10. They also begin rising toward the end of the forecast
horizon, regaining significance at quarter 56.  With  higher interest tdss  increasing  the
velocity of money, the brief period of monetary contraction does not prevent nominal
GDP from rising. Consequently,  the GDP deflator increases  by more than GDP falls.
The deflator reaches  a maximum  value  of 9.0percent  higher in quarter 21,  becoming
insignificant at quarter 39.  For the maximum values of the oil price and price level
shocks,  the oil-price elasticity  of the Italian price level is 0.117.
Japan
For Japan, like Italy and the United States,  the oil-price shock initially  leads to a
13slight rise in real GNP that is significant for the flrst four quarters.T By the 14th quarter,
real GNP begins a significant decline.  By qtarter  29, real Japanese  GNP falls by its
maximum significant value of  5.2 percent.  By quarter 32 the real Japanese  GNP is no
longer significantly different than its initial  value.  Using the maximum significant values,
the oil-price elasticity  of real Japanese  GNP is -0.043.
For Japan, the monetary aggregate  is not significantly different from its pre-shock
values in quarters two through 15, then exhibits a t€mporary decline until  quarter 28.
Japanese  short-term interest rates are increased  following an oil price shock.  The
confidence bands also reveal two periods (Q19 through Q27 and Q44 through Q56) in
which short-term interest rates are not significantly different from the pre-shock value.
With the rise in interest rates and no initial  contraction in the money zupply, the
oil price shock leads to a rise in nominal GNP -  the increase in the Japanese  price level
is greater than the loss in real GNP.  The increase  in the price level reaches  a maximum
of 2 percent in quarter 18 and then becomes insignificant after quarter 24.  Using the
maximum  values,  the oil-price elasticity  of the Japanese  price level is 0.016.
Norway
For Norway, an energy-exporting  country like Canada, real GDP shows  no
response  to a real oil price shock, hence the oil-price elasticity of real GDP is zero.
Although higher energy prices increase  tle  value of Norwegian exports, which increase
Norwegian income, Norwegian output renains unchanged.
Nonetheless,  after five quarters without a significant response,  short-tenn interest
rates are pushed higher in Norway.  The increase in short rates remains significant
74through quarter 50.  In addition, there is a delayed monetary aggregate  response  as the
Norwegian monetary aggregate  rises in quarters 18 through 52.
With  increased  income, higher shortterm  interest rates, and eventually an
increase  in the monetary aggregatf, the Norwegian price level rises throughout the 60-
quarter time horizon.  The rise in nominal GDP is indicative of the expansionary
monetary policy that often results from improved terms of trade.  Normalizing the
maxirnum gain in the price level by the maximum gain in the real Norwegian price of oil
tle  yields  an estimated  oil-price elasticity  of the price level equal to 0.308.
The Uniteil Kingdom
For the United Kingdom, like Germany, the oil price shock leads to a persistent
loss  of real GDP.  By quarter  60, real GDP is reduced  18.4  percent,  the oil-price
elasticity  of real GDP is -0.121.
Short-term interest rates rise temporarily in the U.K. and are significant only in
quarters five through 12. As is the case  for Germany, lhe U.K. monetary aggregate  and
nominal GDP show a continuous decline throughout the 60-quarter time horizon.  These
declines are clearly indicative of a contractionary monetary policy.
After  showing a small, but significant rise for the frst  five quarters, the GDP
deflator becomes  insignificant and remains so for the duration of the 60 quarter time
horizon.  For the maximum significant change in the U.K. price level, the corrcsponding
oil-price elasticity  of t}e price level is positive  at 0.007.
15A Trodeoff:  GDP Lass  or Inflntion
A comparison of the response  to oil price shocks  across  the eight OECD countries
shows  evidence of a tradeoff between GDP loss and a higher price level.  As shown in
Table 2,  rank ordering the eight countries by the magnitude of their GDP loss and the
increase  in the price level is nearly perfectly inverse.
Use of the oil price elasticities of GDP loss and the price level permits a closer
examination of the tradeoff between GDP loss and a higher price level.  As shown in
figure 2, countries defening the GDP loss through accommodative  monetary policy in
which nominal GDP rises (Italy, Japan and the United States), generally end up with a
greater increase in the price level and a smaller GDP loss than those countries accepting
an immediate GDP loss through a restrictive monetary policy i-n  which nominal GDP
falls (France,  Germany  and the United Kingdom).8
We further analyze the tradeoff by ranking counffies according to their energy-
consumption-to-GDP ratios.  For each of the energy-importirg countries, figure 3 shows
a hypothetical tradeoff between increases  in the price level and GDP loss that could
result from an oil price shock. For any pair of countries in figure 3, the curve
representing the country with tle  lower energy-consumption-to-GDP  ratio is closer to the
origin.  The result is a well-behaved family of curves. For each country, given a level of
energy colNumption, the curves illustrate a continuous tradeoff between inflation  and
GDP, a set  of iso-energy-intensity  curves,  so to speak.  e
Under a neutral monetary policy in which nominal GDP is held constant these
curves imply that for any pair of energy-importing counffies, the country with the higher
16energy-consumption-to-GDP  ratio experiences  a greater GDP loss and a greater irrcrease
in the price level.  Deviations from a neutral policy can yield a smaller loss in GDP at
the expense  of a higher price level or vice versa.
5.  ST]MMARYAND CONCLUSION
We use impulse responses  from a VAR  model to assess  how oil price shocks
move through major channels  of an economy to affect aggregate  economic activity and
inflation  in eight OECD countries--Canada,  France, Germany, Italy, Iapan, Norway, the
United Kingdom and the United States. For each country, the model represents  the
interactions between six variables:  tle  real oil price, real GDP, a monetary aggregate,
short-term interest rates, the spread  between long and short-term rates, and a deflator.
Taken together, the responses  of GDP and inflation  across  the eight countries
present a consistent picture.  For energy-exporting  countries, such as Canada and
Norway, an oil-price shock yields more favorable terms of trade, and higher income, but
no increase in output.  The improved terms of trade result in a classical increase in the
monetary aggregate  and a higher price level.
For energy-importing countries, an oil price shock presents a trade-off between an
increased  price level and a GDP loss. The higher is a country's energy-consumption-to-
GDP ratio (or net-energy-imports-to-GDP ratio), the less attractive is the tradeoff.
Given the tradeoff it faces,  each country's internal policies determine how much of the
shock will be experienced  as a GDP loss and how much will be experienced  as an
irrcrease  in the price level.  Although it does not appear that an energy-importing country
t7can use its intemal macroeconomic  policies to eliminate the effect of oil price shocks  on
GDP, countries seem  to be able to defer and reduce the effect by accepting higher rates
of inflation.
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20Notes
1.  Although real oil prices are somewhat  more volatile than real energy prices,
changes  in real oil prices may represent changes  in energy prices.  Yicel  and Guo (1994)
have shown that oil prices and other energy prices generally move together in the long
run.
2.  Data for some series are available for a longer span of time.  We restricted the
estimation period to one in which oil prices showed  volatility.
3.  The VAR  approach also enables one to calculate the variance decomposition of
the system. The information provided by the impulse response  functions and variance
decompositions  is the same,  but presented in an alternate form.
4.  The reported value is calculated on a constant elasticity basis.
5.  Kahn and Hampton (1990) find an oil price shock is likely to lead to a persistent
pick-up in the inllation  rate because  cost-of-living adjusfinent clauses  and other contracts
raise input prices and inflationary expectations  are increased.
6.  Darby (1982) notes that additional factors, such as the final breakdown of pegged
exchange  rates and the dismantling of price controls, may have augmented the
inflationary effects of oil price shocks.
7.  For Japan, statistics on GDP are not generally available, hence, data on GNP is
used.
8.  In figures 2 and 3, the 45 degree line represents  neutral monetary policy, that is one
in which nominal GDP is constant and the GDP loss equals the increase in the price
level.
9.  We also experimented by ranking countries by their energy import to GDP ratios.
Again the result is a well-behaved family of curves. For each country, the curves







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OIL-PRICE ELASTICTTIES  OF GDP LOSS  AND THE PRICE LEVEL




GDP l.ossFigure  3
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